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Abstract
In this paper we consider the equilibrium eects of an institutional investor
whose performance is benchmarked to an index. In a partial equilibrium setting,
the objective of the institutional investor is modeled as the maximization of
expected utility (an increasing and concave function, in order to accommodate
risk aversion) of nal wealth minus a benchmark.
In equilibrium this optimal strategy gives rise to the two-beta CAPM in
Brennan (1993): together with the market beta a new risk-factor (that we call
active management risk) is brought into the analysis. This new beta is dened
as the normalized (to the benchmark's variance) covariance between the asset
excess return and the excess return of the market over the benchmark index.
Dierent to Brennan, the empirical test supports the model's predictions.
The cross-section return on the active management risk is positive and sig-
nicant especially after 1990, when institutional investors have become the
representative agent of the market.
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The considerable increase in both the gross amount as well as the proportion of money
managed by institutional investors observed in the last two decades (remarkably dur-
ing the 1990s) has prompted a growing interest in the portfolio choice decisions of
these investors and its eect on market prices. More specically, we are interested in
two well documented regularities, namely,
 the growing percentage of the stock market held by institutional investors
(mainly mutual and pension funds) and
 the dierent target of individuals (households) and institutional investors in
solving for their respective optimal portfolios.
The evolution of the stock funds total net assets1 as a percentage of the stock
market capitalization might be useful to illustrate the increasing importance of in-
stitutional investors in equity trading. From 1984 to 1990, the percentage ranged
between 5 % and 8%. After 1990 it has been increasing up to above 25 % in De-
cember 1997. The number of (stock) funds in the sample observed an almost tenfold
increase as of January, 1984. A parallel increase in the ratio of mutual funds to direct
holdings of US equities (rising from a negligible amount in 1970 to about 25% in
1990) has been reported by Sirri and Tufano (1993).
These gures seem to suggest that institutional investors (rather than households)
should indeed be considered the \representative agent" in stock markets.
At this point, a question arises: Could it be argued that the (optimal portfolio
choice) objective of institutional investors is dierent from that of households? Given
the weight of institutional investors in the market a positive answer to the previous
question will have to be followed by an analysis of its equilibrium implications.
It has been argued that \most mutual-fund managers actively buy and sell stocks
in a bid to beat the market. Index-fund managers, called `passive' investors, seek
simply to match the performance of market indices, such as the Standard & Poor's
500.2" This behavior implies that, while households will be interested in maximiza-
tion of nal wealth, the results of institutional investors will be compared to some
benchmark, usually some index of domestic securities.
A survey by Del Guercio and Tkac (1998) reports that 59% of mutual fund in-
vestors compared fund performance to that of an index. This percentage is lower
1The sample under consideration includes over 95% of the total US stock fund industry. Data
provided by the Investment Company Institute (ICI). The ICI includes over 6,867 mutual funds and
447 close-end funds. Its mutual fund members represent more than 63 million individual shareholders
and manage more than $ 4.8 trillion. The Wilshire 5000 Index was used as a proxy for the US stock
market capitalization value.
2The Wall Street Journal, January 28 of 1997.
1than that in the pension fund industry where virtually in all cases manager's portfo-
lio performance is compared to an index.3
We therefore believe that institutional investors behave dierently from house-
holds. Additionally, the former type of investor is gradually replacing the later as the
\representative agent" in asset markets.
Roll (1992) shows, in a partial equilibrium framework, that the preferences as-
sumed for a benchmarked investor (the representative institutional investor in our
model) induce a discrepancy between her optimal portfolio and that of the standard
risk-averse investor. Brennan (1993, 1995) studies the asset pricing implications of
this alleged dierence in a general equilibrium setting where institutional, bench-
marked investors are present. He tests the model using monthly data from January
1931 through December 1991. The empirical evidence fails to support the model's
predictions.
In this paper the model is tested on a monthly data sample from January 1973
through December 1997. Unlike in Brennan (1993), the results reported seem to
support the objective function postulated for the representative institutional investor.
Moreover, the empirical success of the model is shown to be robust to changes in the
market and benchmark indexes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple pure
exchange, one-period closed economy. Agents can be either households or institutional
investors. Assuming constant absolute risk-aversion utility functions, we compare
the optimal portfolio of both types of investors. After that, a general equilibrium
(CAPM) asset pricing equation is derived. Besides the standard systematic (market)
risk-factor, a new factor is brought into the analysis: the active management risk.
Our model predicts a positive expected reward on the active management risk.
Section 3 contains the empirical analysis of the paper. The predictions of the
(extended) CAPM derived in Section 2 are tested on a monthly sample of 220 US
assets, since January 1973 through December 1997. The S&P 500 index is taken as
the benchmark. Results conrm the model's predictions. Some robustness tests are
performed in Section 3.3.1. Section 3.3.2 shows further evidence from the UK market.
We close the paper with some conclusions.
2 The model
We derive a simple one-period equilibrium model. The framework is a pure exchange
economy with only one consumption good. We rst solve for the optimal portfolios
of the agents in the economy. In the spirit of Merton (1973), we assume that the
market capitalization value and market index portfolio are given. In equilibrium,
3Consider as well the usual practice observed in the mutual fund industry where funds advertise
the record of years and the percentage by which they have outperformed \the market" represented
by a benchmark index (typically the S&P 500 Index in the case of American assets).
2supply equals demand and capital markets clear.
Investors only care about nal wealth. The investment opportunity set consists
of N dierent assets. We will denote by ~ r = (~ ri); i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng the vector of gross
returns (in units of the consumption good). All assets are traded in a frictionless
market where unlimited short selling is allowed. We assume ~ r  N(;) with 
a positive denite matrix. 1 2 <N will represent a column vector of ones.4 Let us
denote ! 2 <N the vector of wealth weights invested in each security.
We will distinguish between two types of investors: absolute and benchmark in-
vestors. The representative absolute investor will choose her optimal (utility maxi-
mizing) portfolio in the standard mean-variance space.5 Besides the risky assets, the
absolute investor can also invest in a risk-free asset with return R. Assuming a con-






1(  R1): (1)
Now consider the problem of a portfolio manager in a mutual or pension fund. This
manager will be evaluated with respect to a given, exogenous benchmark portfolio
 2 <N('1 = 1). For each expected excess return (above the benchmark's return)
the manager will choose the portfolio with the minimum tracking error volatility. Let
us denote ! = (! ) the net portfolio, that is, relative to the benchmark portfolio.











Roll (1992) and, more recently, Diacogiannis (1999) show that, when the bench-
mark portfolio  is mean-variance inecient, the locus that results from solving the
benchmark investor's problem is suboptimal: for any target excess return, k, the mini-
mum tracking error managed portfolio is dominated by feasible portfolios with higher
average return and lower (total) volatility. As shown in Roll (1992), the net portfolio




where  and  represent the multipliers of the excess return and wealth constraints,
respectively. Clearly,  represents the usual risk-return tradeo: higher expected
excess return (above the benchmark's return) comes to the cost of higher tracking
error volatility. The case k = 0 would correspond to an index fund.
4In general, bold characters will represent column vectors. Prime (0) will denote transpose.
5See, for instance, Roll (1977).
3Our benchmark investor will be interpreted as a portfolio manager with constant
absolute risk aversion coecient,  > 0. We could assume dierent dierent risk
aversion coecients for the absolute and benchmark investors; however, none of the







Finally, given (2) the optimal portfolio of the benchmark investor will be:




1(  (A=C)1); (3)
with A = 101 and C = 1011; the ratio A=C represents the expected return
on the minimum variance portfolio of (purely) risky assets.
Let us denote Wa (Wb) the initial wealth of the absolute (benchmark) investor.
Aggregate demand D will be:
D = Wa !a + Wb !b:
Risky assets are assumed to be in positive net supply. Let us introduce S, the
(equilibrium) value of the aggregate market portfolio of risky assets and xM 2 <N
(x0
M1 = 1), the market portfolio vector of weights. We will assume that S and xM are
exogenously given. The asset market is assumed to be always in equilibrium. Market
clearing requires D = S xM. Replacing both portfolios with their values in equations
(1) and (3), the market clearing condition becomes:
Wb + H
1 
1(  r1) = S xM: (4)





is the risk aversion coecient (relative to the aggregate wealth in equilibrium);
r =
Wa R + Wb A=C
Wa + Wb
represents the expected return on the \aggregate" minimum variance portfolio.
Notice that, in the absence of benchmark investors (Wb = 0), r coincides with the
risk-free rate, R, and the model collapses into the traditional one-factor CAPM.
Equation (4) can be rearranged as follows:7
6We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
7The vertical dots (
. . .) denote column juxtaposition.
4  r1 = (xM
. . .( xM  )) 
 




(N  1) (N  1
. . .N  1) (2  1)
(5)
for all  2 <. Equation (5) shows a general equilibrium relationship between
stocks' expected (excess) return and stocks' covariance with both the market portfolio
and the dierence between the market and benchmark portfolios. The expected return
on the covariance with the market index, xM, is the standard CAPM result; however,
portfolio managers care about relative performance. Therefore, not all market risk
is systematic risk for these investors: only active management risk should be priced,
i.e., the covariance with  xM  .8
According to (5), the active management risk should arise for any benchmark
index (ecient or not) non proportional to the market portfolio. If the optimal
benchmark were endogenously determined by the model then any test on (5) would
be a test exclusively on the asset pricing implications of the model; however, since the
choice of the benchmark is exogenous, it will be a joint test on the model's predictions
and the choice of the benchmark index. We will return to this issue in Section 3.
We introduce the following notation:
M = x
0
M (  r1);
 = 
0 (  r1):
They represent the expected market and benchmark risk premia, respectively.
Pre-multiplying both terms in equation (5) by (xM
. . . xM  )0 we obtain
 
M












. . . xM  )
0 (xM
. . . xM  )
is the variance-covariance matrix of the market portfolio and the net portfolio.
In the following section we perform the empirical analysis of the paper.
8Notice that the one-factor CAPM is embedded in the model: when  = xM, active management
risk disappears as a dierentiated risk factor. The standard CAPM result follows: only covariance
with the market portfolio is priced.
53 Empirical analysis
Equation (6) is the key to the risk premia in our model: how both risk factors are, on
average, rewarded. In orther to specify the model and derive testable implications, 













The parameter ^  represents the covariance between the market portfolio and the
benchmark over the market portfolio volatility: the slope of the regression of the
benchmark on the market, i.e., the \unexplained" part of the benchmark portfolio.
The portfolio ^  xM is orthogonal to the market portfolio. It can be interpreted as a
hedge portfolio in the terminology of Merton (1973). As a consequence, (^  xM )
in equation (5) can be read as the conditional (on the market portfolio's return)
covariance between the vector of gross returns and the return on the benchmark
portfolio.9
Substituting ^  in (6):
M = x
0
M xM  H (S  ^  Wb); (8)
^  M   = 
0 (1  
2
M )  H Wb; (9)
where M  is the correlation coecient between the market portfolio and the
benchmark; x0
M xM is the (unconditional) market volatility and 
0 (1  2
M )
the conditional (on the market return) volatility of the benchmark portfolio.
According to (8), when we evaluate (6) at ^  the sign of the expected market risk
premium, M, depends on the concrete value of the slope coecient, ^ . This means
that the model cannot predict the sign of the unconditional market risk-premium. As
a consequence, the mean-variance eciency of the market portfolio is not an issue in
our tests.10
On the other side, given the denition of H and w = Wb=(Wa+Wb), equation (9)
becomes:
^  M   =  w
0 (1  
2
M ): (10)
9We are grateful to the editor, Chris Adcock, for suggesting this interpretation.
10For tests on the mean-variance eciency of the market portfolio see, for instance, Britten-Jones
(1999), Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) and Green (1986).
6Equation (10) shows that, in equilibrium, the expected active management risk
premium is proportional (w) to the benchmark's volatility \weighted" by the com-
plement to one of the (square) correlation between both portfolios. The higher the
correlation, the lower the net market risk premium \per unit" of risk in equilibrium.
Given the assumptions of the model ( > 0 y  positive denite), the righthand
side term in (10) is nonnegative; strictly positive for all 2
M  < 1. Notice that this
result is independent of the value of ^ .
As mentioned in Section 2, if the market portfolio and the benchmark are perfectly
correlated (2
M  = 1) the active management risk cannot be distinguished from the
(absolute) market risk and the model becomes the standard one-factor CAPM. In the
other case, when such a risk exists (2
M  < 1) the corresponding risk premium is, on
average, positive.
Equation (10) predicts that if the model is true and  is the benchmark for port-
folio evaluation, then the active management risk premium is, on average, positive.
In this sense we say that empirical testing of equation (10) involves a \joint test" on
the model's predictions and the benchmark choice.
3.1 Description of data
We will take the Standard & Poor's S&P 500 monthly index return as the return
on the benchmark portfolio.11 The US Morgan Stanley Capital Indices (US-MSCI)
index monthly return series will be taken as the market portfolio return. For the
locally risk-free asset, the monthly return series of the three month Treasury Bill will
be used. Our sample begins in January, 1973 and extends through December, 1997.
As risky assets, we selected the 220 US securities that have been in the S&P 500
index without interruption from January, 1978 through December, 1997. Table I sum-
marizes some descriptive statistics from the sample of selected risky assets compared
to the S&P 500 Index. We selected this sub-sample of assets in the S&P 500 since we
want to avoid the possible price eects associated with changes in the composition
of the index. Any abnormal return captured in our tests cannot be explained by the
assets being added or deleted from the benchmark index.
As in Adcock and Clark (1999) we will express the two-factor CAPM as a function
of the conditonal moments. Let us denote RM (RS&P) the market (benchmark) risk
premium. Following Errunza and Losq (1985), the benchmark is regressed on the
market portfolio. The residuals of this regression (multiplied by minus one, eS&P)
and the hedge portfolio ^  xM  (orthogonal to the market portfolio by construction)
are numerically identical. Therefore, provided that the model is correct:
11The S&P 500 Index consists of 500 stocks chosen for market size, liquidity, and industry group
representation. It is a market-value weighted index, with each stock's weight in the Index propor-
tional to its market value. In January, 1998, industrials accounted for 76% of the companies in the
Index; utilities 7.4%, nancials 14.2% and transportation 2%. Over 90% of the stocks in the Index




0 1 + 
i
M RM  
i
S&P eS&P + 
i; (11)
for every asset i. i
S&P and i
M are, respectively, the benchmark (conditional
covariance) and market (unconditional covariance) betas. The residual terms  are
assumed to be i.i.d. Betas, variances and covariances are stationary over time.
3.2 Methodology
We follow Fama and MacBeth (1973). Testing (10) implies a two-step process: rst,
estimating the market and benchmark betas according to equation (11); then, running
cross-section regressions of stock's expected returns on the estimated betas:
Rt = 0;t 1 + M;t ^ M;t1 + S&P;t ^ S&P;t1 + t; (12)
for each month t. The (monthly) time series means of ~ M and ~ S&P will then
be used to test (H1) whether the market, on average, rewards both market and
active management risk and (H2) on average, the active management risk premium
is positive.
The sample (1973-97) is divided in three periods: (1) January, 1973 to December,
1987, (2) January, 1978 to December, 1992 and (3) January, 1983 to December, 1997.
Within each period the sample is again divided into three more subperiods, each
including ve consecutive years. The rst ve years will constitute the portfolio
formation period; the next ve years will be the initial estimation period. The testing
period will include the last ve years. Table II summarizes the whole structure of
divisions and subdivisions of the data sample.
In each portfolio formation period, equilibrium asset returns are assumed to satisfy
(11). In the rst place, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions will be run for the
220 US risky assets with excess returns as dependent variables and market excess
return and residual series as regressors.
To obtain more precise estimates of the betas, assets will be grouped into port-
folios. Assuming that the measurement errors are uncorrelated across assets, the
variance of the measurement errors for the portfolio betas would approach zero as
the number of assets in each portfolio increases. However, there is a tradeo between
precision and eciency involved in this process. This issue is especially relevant in
our test since neither the number of assets nor the time-horizon of the sample are too
large.
Every portfolio formation period assets are sorted according to their estimated
market index beta. Then, we will calculate the dierence between the rst and
the last market beta and divide it by 10. The ranked assets are then grouped into
portfolios. Every time an asset is added to a portfolio the median market beta of
the portfolio is calculated. If the next asset's market beta does not diverge from the
median more than half the benchmark distance previously calculated, then the asset
8is included into the portfolio. Otherwise, the actual portfolio is closed and the new
asset is included in the next portfolio. This process is repeated until every asset is
included in some portfolio. Assets are then simply averaged within each portfolio.
Within every portfolio formation period, new OLS regressions will be run with
portfolio mean returns as the new dependent variables. The resulting portfolio market
and benchmark (residuals) estimated betas, together with the corresponding standard
errors, are presented in Table III. We also include intercept estimates and standard
errors. The resulting portfolios in each period are 11, 9 and 10, respectively. As
predicted, the estimated benchmark betas, ^ S&P, are all negative and, in most of the
cases (especially in the last two periods), highly signicant. All the estimated market
betas are positive and virtually all statistically highly signicant.
Within every initial portfolio estimation subperiod, regressions are run keeping
the same portfolios constructed in the portfolio formation period but now using data
from the next 5 years. Thereafter, portfolio betas are themselves updated yearly
through the testing period. For instance, in the rst testing period (1983-87) the 11
portfolio betas will be recomputed yearly using monthly returns from 1978 through
1982 to 1986. These betas will be the independent variables in regression (12): Each
month, portfolios' returns are (cross-section) regressed on the market and benchmark
betas estimated from January, 1978 through December of the previous year.
This three-stage process is repeated in Period 2 and Period 3. This allows port-
folios to be rebalanced every 5 years, at each portfolio formation period. The time
series means of the monthly regressions slopes ( ^ 
0;t,  ^ 
M;t and  ^ 
S&P;t) from January,
1983 through December, 1997 will provide standard tests on hypothesis H1 and H2.
3.3 Analysis of the results
Table IV.A presents the average slope coecients for dierent time intervals from
regression (12) in the testing period. Standard deviations and t-values for each of the
average slopes are also reported.
When considering the whole testing period, 1983-1997, both market and active
management risk are positively rewarded and statistically dierent from zero at the
10% level. It is more interesting, though, to see the value of these statistics when
the sample is split in two subperiods: From January, 1983 to December, 1991 and
from January, 1992 to December, 1997. In the rst subperiod, neither the absolute
nor the net market risk premia are signicantly dierent from zero. In the second,
both risk-factors are positively rewarded and statistically dierent from zero at 5%,
supporting hypothesis H1 and H2.
As supplementary evidence in favor of H2, Table V presents the average slopes
from regression (12), together with t-values, computed yearly from January 1990
through December 1997. The average slope coecient for the active management risk,
 ^ 
S&P;t, is statistically signicant at 5%, from December 1992 onwards. The average
slope presents a sixfold increase from 1991 to 1992. Then, it gradually decreases along
9the years. According to the ICI sample of stock funds (which includes over 95% of
the total US stock fund industry), the total net assets in the stock fund industry
rose 67% in 1991. After 1991, the amount of net assets have increased (always at
smaller percentages) along the years. We do not have data concerning the pension
fund industry.
3.3.1 Results with alternative market and benchmark indices
Panel B in table IV reports the results of performing the same tests as in Panel A
after replacing US-MSCI with the US-Datastream as the market portfolio index. The
S&P 500 will remain as the benchmark portfolio.
This exercise aims to test how robust our results are to the choice of the market
index. Table IV.B shows that the average return on the (absolute) market risk is not
signicant at any level, no matter the time interval considered. This result coincides
with other results in the empirical literature on CAPM testing, such as Chen, Roll
and Ross (1986) and Fama and French (1992): The market-beta has no \explanatory
power" in the cross-section regressions. The expected return on the active manage-
ment risk is positive and signicant (at the 10% level). It is interesting to see that
all the signicance in the test comes from the last years in the sample.
Therefore, the market risk premium is shown to be very sensitive to the market
index choice while the active management risk is (partially) robust to the change.
Panel C in tables IV shows a symmetric exercise. Now, US-MSCI will remain as
the market index while the S&P 500 will be replaced with the Dow Jones Industrials
(DJI) index. The three indices are highly correlated among themselves. This new
exercise purports to empirically test whether the results reported in Panel A could
be replicated by any pair of (highly correlated) market index proxies. If the results
reported in Panel A did not qualitatively change, this would evidence that they are
to a large extent spurious: The positive expected reward on the active management
risk would not necessarily represent empirical support for the theoretical model in
Section 2.
Table IV.C shows that the average return on the net market risk (with respect
to the DJI) is non-signicant and even negative in some time intervals. The average
return on the market risk is positive (though non-signicant) when considering the
whole testing period, 1983-1997.
Therefore, when the S&P 500 is replaced with the DJI the data fails to support
hypothesis H1-H2. We take this as evidence in favor of our model. Both indices are
common proxies for market performance and thus, highly correlated. However, only
the S&P 500 (clearly the dominant domestic index for management compensation in
the US) is priced as active management risk.
103.3.2 Results from the test on UK stocks
As a complementary robustness test we replicate the original exercise on 64 stocks
trading in the London Stock Exchange. As a locally risk-free rate, the monthly
return series of the three months interbank-loans rate will be used.12 The FTSE 100
monthly index return is taken as the return on the benchmark portfolio. Finally, the
UK-Datastream index will be used as the market portfolio.13 Our sample expands
from January, 1980 through December, 1996.
During the rst portfolio formation period (January, 1980 through December,
1982) 10 portfolios were formed. A total of 11 portfolios were constructed during the
second formation period (January, 1983 through December, 1987). The total testing
period extends from January, 1988 through December, 1996.
The results from the test are shown in Table VI. The total sample results show
little support in favor of the model: both the market and, more importantly, the
benchmark average risk-premia are non-signicant. However, it is interesting to notice
how the sign on the later changes from the rst to the second half of the testing
period. In the last four years of the sample (arguably when the trading volume by
institutional investors should be higher) the average risk-premium on the benchmark
beta ( ^ 
FTSE;t) is positive (as predicted by the model) and signicant at the 10%.
We interpret this result as (partial) evidence in favor of the model. We believe
that the results from the UK stocks are not as conclusive as the evidence documented
for the US stocks since, to our knowledge, there is no such a pervasive consensus on
the FTSE 100 as the benchmark index for the compensation of British fund managers
(compared with the S & P 500 in the American case).
4 Conclusions
In the spirit of Brennan (1993) we consider the optimal strategy of an institutional
investor that tries to maximize the surplus of nal wealth over a benchmark. In equi-
librium this gives rise to a two factor CAPM where the rst factor is the traditional
market risk component and the second factor represents the risk of deviating from
the benchmark. We extend Brennan's test up to December 1997. The benchmark we
use is the S&P 500 Index and the securities are all 220 stocks that have been in the
S&P 500 during the period considered.
The test conrms the model's hypothesis, especially in the last part of our time
sample as it should be expected since it represents historically the peak in market
participation of institutional investors. This result is shown to be robust to changes in
the market and benchmark indexes. Additional evidence is presented on UK stocks.
Other equilibrium eects of this phenomenum are left for future research.
12We prefer this rate over the UK T-bill series since the later is a rather illiquid market.
13The time series correlation of both indexes is 97.22%.
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Risky Assets Sample and S&P 500 Statistics
(millions of US dollars)
Assets sample S&P 500
Total Market value 4,528 103 7,657 103
Mean Market Value 21,060 15,313
Median Market Value 8,805 6,905
Largest Company's Market Value 243,300 253,636
Smallest Company's Market Value 535 430
Note: Data as of January 1998.
TABLE II




Porfolio formation period 1973-77 1978-82 1983-87
Initial estimation period 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92
Testing period 1983-87 1988-92 1993-97
14TABLE III
Estimated intercept, market and benchmark betas
~ Rt = 0 + ~ RM;tM  ~ eS&P;tS&P + ~ t
Every portfolio formation period, equilibrium asset returns are assumed to satisfy the equation above. In the
rst place, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions will be run for the 220 US risky assets with excess returns
as dependent variables and market excess return and residual series as regressors. Ater that, assets are sorted
according to their estimated market index beta. Then, we will calculate the dierence between the rst and
the last market beta and divide it by 10. Under the assumption of a uniform distribution of estimated marked
betas, this distance would yield 10 portfolios of 22 assets each one. It represents a benchmark dispersion
measure.
The ranked assets are then gathered into portfolios. Every time an asset is added to a portfolio the median
market beta of the portfolio is calculated. If the next asset's market beta does not diverge from the median
more than half the benchmark distance previouly calulated, then the asset is included into the portfolio.
Otherwise, the actual portfolio is closed and the new asset is included in the next portfolio. This process is
repeated until every asset is included in some portfolio. Assets are then simply averaged within each portfolio.
New OLS regressions are run with portfolio mean returns as the new dependent variables.
US Morgan Stanley Capital Index is used as the market index. S&P 500 is the benchmark (s.e. stands for
standard error).
Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Portfolio Formation Period 1973-77
^ 0 0.015 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.01 0.015 0.01 0.026 0.024 0.033
s.e. 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.019 0.014
^ M 0.246 0.673 0.902 1.139 1.317 1.468 1.658 1.826 1.968 2.173 2.331
s.e. 0.243 0.044 0.04 0.038 0.059 0.063 0.125 0.123 0.22 0.364 0.28
^ S&P -0.812 -0.704 -0.856 -0.814 -1.111 -1.109 -0.753 -1.382 -3.502 -0.767 -1.611
s.e. 1.032 0.185 0.169 0.16 0.252 0.266 0.532 0.522 0.931 1.542 1.189
Portfolio Formation Period 1978-82
^ 0 -0.006 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.019 0.02 0.022 .... ....
s.e. 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.01 .... ....
^ M 0.287 0.618 0.858 1.069 1.268 1.48 1.66 1.867 2.124 .... ....
s.e. 0.094 0.074 0.06 0.042 0.052 0.068 0.094 0.131 0.22 .... ....
^ S&P -0.157 -1.002 -0.793 -1.042 -1.128 -1.182 -1.748 -1.545 -1.347 .... ....
s.e. 0.318 0.249 0.202 0.143 0.175 0.23 0.318 0.443 0.743 .... ....
Portfolio Formation Period 1983-87
^ 0 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.01 0.003 ....
s.e. 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.01 0.021 ....
^ M 0.312 0.491 0.706 0.87 1.072 1.258 1.406 1.54 1.725 1.976 ....
s.e. 0.104 0.066 0.042 0.024 0.034 0.046 0.063 0.183 0.192 0.405 ....
^ S&P -0.054 -0.109 -0.631 -0.991 -1.132 -1.144 -1.233 -0.721 -2.391 -0.128 ....
s.e. 0.41 0.259 0.164 0.096 0.133 0.180 0.25 0.724 0.756 1.599 ....
15TABLE IV
US stocks: Average slope coecients (100).
~ Rt = ~ 0;t + ~ M;t ^ M;t1 + ~ S&P;t ^ S&P;t1 + ~ t
Panel A: US-MSCI as market index and S&P 500 as benchmark. Panel B: US-Datastream
as market index and S&P 500 as benchmark. Panel C: US-MSCI as market index and Dow
Jones Industrials as benchmark (s stands for standard deviation, t stands for t-value).
See the text for details.
Statistic
Period  ^ 
0;t  ^ 
M;t
 ^ 
S&P;t s(^ 0;t) s(^ M;t) s(^ S&P;t) t( ^ 
0;t) t( ^ 
M;t) t( ^ 
S&P;t)
Panel A
1983-1997 -0.03 2.41 1.78 0.08 0.2 0.13 -0.04 1.65 1.80
1983-1991 1.09 -0.28 0.36 0.09 0.16 0.09 1.3 -0.17 0.41
1992-1997 -1.7 6.44 3.91 0.07 0.23 0.17 -1.97 2.34 1.87
Panel B
1983-1997 0.59 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.01 1.35 0.09 1.3
1983-1991 0.78 -0.35 0.03 0.062 0.071 0.006 1.3 -0.5 0.44
1992-1997 0.3 0.64 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.5 0.1 1.3
Panel C
1983-1997 0.37 0.2 -0.22 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.7 0.26 -0.43
1983-1991 1.01 -0.79 -0.52 0.08 0.12 0.08 1.43 -0.72 -0.71
1992-1997 -0.2 1.12 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.07 -0.28 1.04 0.09
16TABLE V
US stocks: Average slope coecients (100).
~ Rt = ~ 0;t + ~ M;t ^ M;t1 + ~ S&P;t ^ S&P;t1 + ~ t
From January 1990 through December
Statistic 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
 ^ 
0;t 1.13 -0.11 -2.78 -2.18 -1.96 -1.42 -1.2 -1.3
t-value 0.28 -0.04 -1.28 -1.32 -1.46 -1.25 -1.3 -1.47
 ^ 
M;t -3.69 1.02 10.91 8.67 7.15 6.2 5.72 5.08
t-value -0.41 0.19 1.69 1.79 1.83 1.9 2.03 2.06
 ^ 
S&P;t -0.82 1.33 8.38 6.33 5.26 4.61 4.11 3.27
t-value -0.18 0.47 1.9 1.89 1.95 2.04 2.12 1.9
TABLE VI
UK stocks: Average slope coecients (100).
~ Rt = ~ 0;t + ~ M;t ^ M;t1 + ~ FTSE;t ^ S&P;t1 + ~ t
UK-Datastream as market index and FTSE 100 as benchmark (s stands for standard deviation,
t stands for t-value). See the text for details.
Statistic
Period  ^ 
0;t  ^ 
M;t
 ^ 
FTSE;t s(^ 0;t) s(^ M;t) s(^ FTSE;t) t( ^ 
0;t) t( ^ 
M;t) t( ^ 
FTSE;t)
1988-1996 0.82 -0.75 -0.30 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.59 -0.56 -0.70
1988-1992 1.61 -1.72 -0.95 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.72 -0.80 -1.33
1993-1996 -0.17 0.47 0.51 0.10 0.09 0.03 -0.11 0.34 1.39
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